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Some Thoughts on Political Structure  
as Constitutional Law 
 
The Honorable John J. Gibbons * 
Certainly I am going to endorse everything that Professor Levinson 
has said about Professor Lynch’s wonderful book.  It establishes beyond 
question that there was no real consensus among the so-called founders 
about what the Constitution meant and thus, Professor Levinson is 
undoubtedly right that constitutional law should be taught as an ongoing 
negotiation. 
I will add one more reason why this must be the case.  We talk about 
constitutional law, but law divorced from sanction is not law at all.  It is 
perhaps scholarship, but unless constitutional law has a sanction it is 
nothing more than rhetoric; the ability to sanction a judgment depends 
completely on the will of the current political majority.  The courts have no 
power to enforce a judgment absent that will.  And thus, the very question 
of intentionalism in constitutional law seems to me to be a bit illogical. 
During the five decades I have been a lawyer, original intent, or strict 
construction, has been advanced—primarily by critics of the federal 
judiciary—as the only sound constitutional doctrine.  In particular, critics 
of an allegedly activist Supreme Court have most frequently taken umbrage 
at the Supreme Court’s recognition of certain individual autonomy interests 
as constitutionally protected from regulation by the democratically elected 
branches of federal or state government. 
Perhaps the most influential of them has been Judge Robert H. Bork, 
whose nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987 produced extended 
hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the appropriate interpretive 
posture of judges faced with a constitutional law argument.  With 
considerable erudition, Bork passionately espoused the view that any 
approach other then the search for original intention of the constitutional 
draftsmen was illegitimate because it placed judges in the role of 
lawmakers rather than neutral arbitrators.1 
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Bork and others before him objected to interpretive approaches that 
permit judges to look beyond original intent—principally on the ground 
that judicial review, the authority of the court to declare enacted legislation 
unconstitutional, is severely undemocratic.  Marbury v. Madison,2 decided 
in 1803, was criticized by Thomas Jefferson and members of his party 
almost as soon as it was announced.  Scholarly commentary about the 
unique American contribution to political science—an independent 
judiciary exercising the power of judicial review—has been the mainstay of 
law reviews since their invention in the late nineteenth century. 
Professor Lynch’s book, Negotiating the Constitution: The Earliest 
Debates on Original Intent,3 looks at original intent from a different 
perspective.  As Professor Levinson observed, Lynch’s study covers the 
period in the nation’s history prior to Marbury v. Madison and thus, prior to 
the establishment of the Court’s role as the unique and final expositor of 
the meaning of the written Constitution.  His study begins with the 
compromises made during the Philadelphia convention.4  It explores the 
arguments made during the state ratifying conventions.5  It ends with 
Jefferson’s designation as President by the House of Representatives in 
March of 1801.6 
Thus, it covers the uses made of constitutional argumentation by 
members of the federal executive and the federal legislature during the 
three terms of the Washington and Adams presidencies.  In those twelve 
years the role of the Article III courts in the formation of the new national 
government was less significant than the role of the two political branches. 
One interesting point about the pre-Marbury v. Madison period is the 
relative paucity of legislative activity compared to later periods.  Lynch 
identifies six enactments that raised issues of constitutional interpretation:7 
a law imposing on state officers a uniform oath of allegiance to the 
Constitution; the law recognizing the President’s power to remove 
incompetent department heads in the executive branch; the law establishing 
a national bank; laws appropriating federal funds for the general welfare; 
the Alien Act;8 and the Sedition Act.9 Each of these laws presented the 
question whether, because their subject matter was not specifically 
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enumerated in the list of federal legislative powers in Article I, Section 8, 
they were beyond the political power of the national government. 
With the exception of the Sedition Act, which restricted expression 
and thus presented a First Amendment issue, none of the six enactments 
presented what we would today identify as a human rights issue.  Whether 
or not the Necessary and Proper Clause10 authorized congressional 
legislation on each of these other subjects, obviously some political 
organization could legislate most of them without infringing the human 
rights of individuals affected by the law.  For example, states could, and 
indeed did, prescribe oaths, charter banks, and appropriate funds for 
general welfare.  Which political body, state or federal, could regulate with 
respect to immigration (the Alien Act) was a matter related quite closely to 
the importation of slaves.  But clearly, some political organization could 
legislate to control the borders.  These were all what we who write about 
constitutional law refer to as federalistic questions.  The dispute over the 
presidential removal power was, in contrast, a separation of powers dispute 
between branches of a single political organization, the federal government.  
Thus, except for the Sedition Act, all of the disputes over legislative 
authority in the first twelve years of the national government were over 
matters of political power, not matters of individual liberty or autonomy. 
What Professor Lynch’s study makes perfectly clear is that the 
politicians in the executive branch and the federal legislature used the 
rhetoric of strict construction when it suited their political purposes and 
abandoned that rhetoric when it did not.  James Madison, in particular, 
advancing the interests of the Virginia planters who were his political 
power base, said different things at different times about the limits of 
federal government power and about the respective roles of the federal 
executive and the federal legislature. 
Each of the six pieces of legislation that were enacted during the first 
three presidential terms resulted from a give and take in the political 
branches of the federal government.  The federal courts were simply not 
involved. 
That, I suggest, is precisely how federalism issues and separation of 
powers disputes should be resolved.  They should be resolved by our 
chosen representatives, in the executive and legislative branches of the 
federal government, in place at that particular time.  The great advantage of 
recognizing the authority of the political branches to determine such 
political issues is that their decisions are not final.  Because of the 
periodicity of representation in the Senate, the House of Representatives, 
and the Presidency, those participants in the legislative process cannot bind 
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their successors. 
Thus, to use an example from the first Congress, the decision to create 
a federally-chartered central bank was reconsidered when a later Congress 
refused to re-charter it.  That decision was in turn reconsidered in the 
aftermath of the War of 1812 when Congress once again re-chartered a 
federal central bank.  The Jacksonian Democrats later put the second bank 
of the United States to death in 1832, and federal central banking was not 
restored until the Federal Reserve Bank was created in 1913.11 
Today, basking in the glow of an unprecedented period of strong 
economic growth and limited inflation, most of us wonder how anyone 
could doubt the constitutional authority of Congress to authorize regulation 
of the nation’s money supply by a central bank.  The legislative decision to 
charter the first and second banks look not only constitutional, but much 
wiser than the decisions that had put them out of business.  Leaving the 
control of the money supply in the hands of state-controlled institutions 
was never a sound policy.  However, at various times the representatives in 
control of the federal legislative process thought that it was.  They were 
free to act on that insight or lack of insight until their successors thought 
better of it. 
That is why Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland12 is 
so sound.  Justice Marshall did not suggest that the nation must have a 
central bank, although he probably thought it would be hard to prosper 
without one.  Rather, he recognized that the elected representatives of the 
people could decide such a policy issue from time to time, and that once 
those representatives had spoken, no state could frustrate their decision by 
hostile legislation.13 
This same recognition of the periodicity of representation appears in 
Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.14  That opinion dealt not with the 
power of the federal government, but with the power of the states to 
regulate interstate commerce, despite the grant to Congress of an express 
constitutional authority to do so.  It was argued that the existence of this 
express grant meant that there was no state power to regulate interstate 
commerce.15  Justice Marshall was careful, however, to rest the holding on 
the Licensing and Enrollment Act, a federal statute.  Thus, the court was 
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deferring to the political branch’s decision as to the ultimate reach of state 
power. 
Five years later in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,16 what was 
implicit in Gibbons v. Ogden became explicit.  Where Congress had not 
legislated, Delaware’s regulation of interstate commerce on a navigable 
stream was valid.17  In 1946, the Supreme Court in Prudential Insurance 
Co. v. Benjamin18 confirmed that the political branches of the federal 
government have the final say on state power to regulate interstate 
commerce.19  Nothing that the court has said since 1948 casts doubt on that 
eminently sound proposition.  The court, however, did take a wrong turn 
with respect to the equal protection clause in Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. Ward.20 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent approach with respect to 
federal legislative power has not been as enlightened as that of the majority 
position in the political branches during the first three presidential terms.  
In National League of Cities v. Usery,21 a narrow majority held that 
Congress lacked the power to require state munic ipal corporations to 
comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act, which was garden-variety 
federal economic legislation that had been routinely upheld for over four 
decades.22  That radical departure from prior deference to decisions of the 
political branches on federalism questions was short-lived.  It was 
overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.23 
The return to reason in 1985, when Justice Blackmun changed his 
position, proved not to be permanent either.  An activist majority in United 
States v. Lopez24 invalidated a federal statute prohibiting the possession of 
firearms in a school zone on the ground that the statute invaded the 
reserved powers of the states.  The court refused to defer to the 
determination of the political branches as to what was necessary and proper 
to protect interstate commerce from firearms. 
In Printz v. United States25 the court invalidated a federal statute 
imposing on state officials the duty to register firearms, again relying on 
the absence of federal authority to affect the reserved political powers of 
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the states. 
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. 
College Savings Bank ,26 the Court held that Congress lacked the power to 
require the states to comply with the United States patent laws.  This, 
despite the fact that congressional authority to award patents is expressly 
enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, and that patents are a federally 
created property interest.  According to the majority, neither the Commerce 
Clause27 nor the Enforcement Clause28 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
authorized that legislation.29 
Now, none of the cases I have just mentioned involves any human 
rights issues.  In each instance, some political power could, without unduly 
invading individual autonomy, lay down a rule of decision.  What the court 
did in each case was take sides in what was, at most, a political dispute 
among competing groups over the appropriateness of a given policy.  That 
taking of sides in a political dispute is illustrated graphically in National 
League of Cities and in Garcia, where the issue was whether or not the 
court would take away from labor unions the lobbying victory that they had 
won in the Congress. 
As Justice Blackmun observed in Garcia, the principal and basic limit 
on the federal commerce power is that which is inherent in all 
congressional actions;30 the built-in restraint that our system provides is 
through state participation in federal governmental action.  The political 
process insures that laws that unduly burden the states will not be 
promulgated.  Furthermore, if they are, the people who voted for them will 
be replaced in the next election. 
Thus, Justice Blackmun in Garcia heeded the wise counsel of 
Professor Jessie H. Choper31 and others that the court should defer to the 
political branches the constitutional issue of whether federal action is 
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates state’s 
rights. 
This is as true of Patent Clause legislation as of Commerce Clause 
legislation.  It is as true today as it was during the pre-Marbury v. Madison 
era when Hamilton’s vision of the powers of the central government 
prevailed. 
In the final sentence of his marvelous book, Professor Lynch observes 
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that it is Hamilton who deserves the title “Father of Constitutional Law.”32  
The anti-Federalist activists on the Supreme Court today must have poor 
Alexander Hamilton spinning in his grave. 
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